非理性和自由主义传统

传统认为不允许强制治疗一个病人,即使他的生命岌岌可危。康德或机后,我们可能会捍卫本公约通过吸引自治的不可侵犯,或把自由视为神圣不可侵犯的好处,问题只考虑伤害别人。在这两种情况下,一个异常可能为精神疾病。对康德来说,自治不是无约束;因为它是密不可分的原因,它必须符合理性可以看出规范和整合。拒绝来自精神疾病的治疗据推测非理性,因此他律的,因此可以覆盖没有破坏自治。相比之下,密尔的自由主义传统写道,呼应霍布斯,理解自由仅仅是缺乏约束。在这幅图中,我们不能认为非理性破坏了自由。但这提出了一个问题关于仁慈的允许,但unconsented干预治疗精神疾病。当然,轧机的国防的自由并不延伸到那些不能自治,所以可能允许的但unconsented干预治疗至少有一些精神疾病的病例。 Still, there is no reason to suppose that the mentally ill lack the intelligence or information necessary for liberty, so if liberty is simply the absence of constraint, such interventions would have to rely on the idea that there is some other difference between irrational-but-sane and irrational-but-insane actions such as to mean that the former are compatible with liberty but the latter are not. It is not easy to give an account of this difference without begging the question or smuggling in norms from another tradition. The upshot is that it is hard for the liberal tradition to keep hold of the right to make foolhardy decisions while also allowing for beneficent but unconsented treatment in cases of mental illness.